Leakage-Resilient Non-Malleable Secret Sharing in Non-compartmentalized
  Models by Lin, Fuchun et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
06
19
5v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 J
un
 20
19
Leakage-Resilient Non-Malleable Secret Sharing in
Non-compartmentalized Models
Fuchun Lin∗ Mahdi Cheraghchi† Venkatesan Guruswami‡
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini§ Huaxiong Wang∗
Abstract
Non-malleable secret sharing was recently proposed by Goyal and Kumar in independent
tampering and joint tampering models for threshold secret sharing (STOC18) and secret sharing
with general access structure (CRYPTO18). The idea of making secret sharing non-malleable
received great attention and by now has generated many papers exploring new frontiers in
this topic, such as multiple-time tampering and adding leakage resiliency to the one-shot tam-
pering model. Non-compartmentalized tampering model was first studied by Agrawal et.al
(CRYPTO15) for non-malleability against permutation composed with bit-wise independent
tampering, and shown useful in constructing non-malleable string commitments. In spite
of strong demands in application, there are only a few tampering families studied in non-
compartmentalized model, due to the fact that compartmentalization (assuming that the ad-
versary can not access all pieces of sensitive data at the same time) is crucial for most of the
known techniques.
We initiate the study of leakage-resilient secret sharing in the non-compartmentalized model.
Leakage in leakage-resilient secret sharing is usually modelled as arbitrary functions with bounded
total output length applied to each share or up to a certain number of shares (but never the
full share vector) at one time. Arbitrary leakage functions, even with one bit output, applied
to the full share vector is impossible to resist since the reconstruction algorithm itself can be
used to construct a contradiction. We allow the leakage functions to be applied to the full share
vector (non-compartmentalized) but restrict to the class of affine leakage functions. The leak-
age adversary can corrupt several players and obtain their shares, as in normal secret sharing.
The leakage adversary can apply arbitrary affine functions with bounded total output length
to the full share vector and obtain the outputs as leakage. These two processes can be both
non-adaptive and do not depend on each other, or both adaptive and depend on each other with
arbitrary ordering. We use a generic approach that combines randomness extractors with error
correcting codes to construct such leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes, and achieve constant
information ratio (the scheme for non-adaptive adversary is near optimal).
We then explore making the non-compartmentalized leakage-resilient secret sharing also
non-malleable against tampering. We consider a tampering model, where the adversary can
use the shares obtained from the corrupted players and the outputs of the global leakage func-
tions to choose a tampering function from a tampering family F . We give two constructions
of such leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing for the case F is the bit-wise indepen-
dent tampering and, respectively, for the case F is the affine tampering functions, the latter
is non-compartmentalized tampering that subsumes the permutation composed with bit-wise
independent tampering mentioned above.
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing, introduced independently by Blakley [Bla79] and Shamir [Sha79], is a fundamental
cryptographic primitive with far-reaching applications; e.g., a major tool in secure multiparty
computation (cf. [CDN15]). The goal in secret sharing is to encode a secret s into a number of
shares c1, . . . , cP that are distributed among a set P = {1, . . . , P} of players such that the access
to the secret through collaboration of players can be accurately controlled. An authorized subset of
players is a set A ⊆ P such that the shares with indices in A can be pooled together to reconstruct
the secret s. On the other hand, A is an unauthorized subset if the knowledge of the shares with
indices in A reveals no information about the secret. The set of authorized and unauthorized sets
define an access structure, where the most widely used is the so-called threshold structure. A
threshold secret sharing scheme is defined with respect to a reconstruction threshold r and satisfies
the following property: Any set A ⊆ P with |A| < r is an unauthorized set and any set A ⊆ P with
|A| ≥ r is an authorized set. Any threshold secret sharing scheme sharing ℓ-bit secrets necessarily
requires shares of length at least ℓ, and Shamir’s scheme attains this lower bound [Sti92]. The
information ratio defined as the ratio of the maximum share length to the secret length measures
the storage efficiency of a secret sharing scheme.
Non-malleable codes [DPW18] proposed with applications in tamper-resilient cryptography
in mind are codes with a randomized encoder and a deterministic decoder that provide non-
malleability guarantee with respect to a family F of tampering functions: Decoding the tam-
pered codeword yields the original message or a value that follows a fixed distribution, where
the probability of the first case and the probability distribution in the second case are dictated
by the particular tampering function f ∈ F alone (all probabilities are taken over the random-
ness of the encoder). Intuitively, non-malleable coding prevents the adversary from tampering
with the protected message in a message-specific way, which is the essence of non-malleable cryp-
tology [DDN00]. Perhaps the most widely studied tampering model for non-malleability is the
compartmentalized model called the P -split state model, where for a constant integer P , a tamper-
ing function is described by f = (f1, . . . , fP ), for arbitrary functions fi : {0, 1}
N/P → {0, 1}N/P .
Goyal and Kumar initiated a systematic study of non-malleable secret sharing [GK18a, GK18b]
with inspirations from the non-malleable codes. Their study started with the observation that a
2-split state non-malleable code is a non-malleable 2-out-of-2 (statistical) secret sharing (the pri-
vacy follows directly from non-malleability in the 2-split state model, see [ADKO15b] for a proof).
So the 2-out-of-2 case has many constructions (just to name a few and restrict to information-
theoretic security)[DKO13, ADL18, ADKO15b, ADKO15a, CGL16a, Li17, Li18, CL18]. Goyal and
Kumar [GK18a] proposed two tampering models for r-out-of-P secret sharing for P > 2 and any
r ≤ P . The independent tampering model of non-malleable secret sharing is essentially a secret
sharing with P players, which is non-malleable with respect to the P -split state tampering fam-
ily. The joint tampering model allows the adversary to group any r shares into two subsets of
different size and tamper jointly with the shares within each group but independently across the
two groups. In the follow up work [GK18b], non-malleability was generalized to secret sharing
with general access structures. In the independent tampering model, they constructed a compiler
that transforms any plain secret sharing into a non-malleable secret sharing with the same access
structure. In the joint tampering model, explicit P -out-of-P threshold secret sharing against more
powerful adversaries that can group shares into two overlapping subsets, as long as no authorized
set is jointly tampered, are constructed. The idea of making secret sharing non-malleable against
tampering has attracted a lot of attention and generated many papers exploring new frontiers in
this topic. Srinivasan and Vasudevan [SV18] constructed the first non-malleable secret sharing
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for 4-monotone access structures with constant information ratio. Badrinarayanan and Srinivasan
[BS18] considered a multiple-time tampering model (corresponding to continuous non-malleable
codes) for secret sharing where the tampering adversary can non-adaptively specify a sequence of
tampering functions in the independent tampering model and non-malleability guarantee should
hold for the whole sequence of tampering (assuming the same reconstruction set). Aggarwal et
al. [ADN+18] considered a strengthening of the above multiple-time tampering model that takes
into account the subtlety of secret reconstruction in secret sharing. In particular, they allow the
tampering adversary to control the secret reconstruction from tampered shares by specifying the
reconstruction set in each time (they dub this non-adaptive concurrent reconstruction). Kumar,
Meka, and Sahai [KMS18] initiated the study of leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing,
where the tampering adversary is allowed to base the choice of tampering on the information about
the encoding obtained from leaking every share independently. This defines a stronger type of
tampering (than without leakage) because the randomness of the encoder decreases conditioned
on the leaked value, which has an effect on non-malleability guarantee (relying on the randomness
of the encoder by definition). Faonio and Venturi [FV19] considered a strengthen model that has
multiple-time tampering with adaptive concurrent reconstruction and leakage-resilience, but had to
switch to computational security. See Table 1 for a summary of different models.
Table 1: Comparison of models for the existing LR-SS and NM-SS with P > 2 players
Reference Access Structure Design Goal Leakage/Tampering Model
[DP07] Round complexity based LR-SS Independent Leakage (Ind. L.)
[BDIR18] r-out-of-P LR-SS Ind. L.
2-out-of-P LR-SS Ind. L.
[GK18a] r-out-of-P NM-SS Independent Tampering (Ind. T.)
r-out-of-P NM-SS Joint Tampering (Joint T.)
[GK18b] Arbitrary NM-SS Ind. T.
P -out-of-P NM-SS Joint T.
[BS18] Arbitrary (4-monotone) CNM-SS Continuous Ind. T. (CNM-SS)
[ADN+18] Arbitrary LR-SS Ind. L.
Arbitrary (3-monotone) CNM-SS Non-adap. concurrent reconstruct
[SV18] r-out-of-P LR-SS Ind. L. ← r − 2 shares
Arbitrary (4-monotone) NM-SS Ind. T.
[KMS18] Arbitrary CLR-SS Continuous adap. Joint Leakage
Arbitrary LR-NM-SS Ind. T. ←Ind. L.
[FV19]* Arbitrary LR-CNM-SS Ind. noisy L.
Adap. concurrent reconstruct
r-out-of-P LR-SS Affine L. ——first NComp. L.
This work r-out-of-P LR-NM-SS Bit-wise Ind. T. ← Affine L.
r-out-of-P LR-NM-SS NComp.T.←Affine L. —first NComp.T.
Only the features concerning modelling are captured in this table. Shorthands are defined where they first appear
in the table. The symbol “←” denotes “based on”. [FV19]* has a * because it is the only one using computational
assumptions. “NComp.” is short for “Non-Compartmentalized”. The view of the leakage adversary in “Affine L.”
model contains a choice of r− 1 shares and a bounded length output of a choice of affine functions applied to the full
share vector. The choice of the r − 1 shares and the affine functions can be non-adaptive or adaptive.
A leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme hides the secret from an adversary, who in addition to
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having access to an unqualified set of shares, also obtains some bounded length leakage from all other
shares. Leakage-resiliency for secret sharing was in fact studied much earlier than non-malleable
secret sharing. Dziembowski and Pietrzak [DP07] developed an intrusion-resilient secret sharing
scheme using alternating extractors. Dav`ı, Dziembowski and Venturi [DDV10] constructed the first
2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme that statistically hides the secret even after an adaptive adversary
executes a bounded communication leakage protocol on the two shares. The leakage-resilient non-
malleable codes in 2-split state model of Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12] (computational security) and
[ADKO15b] are also 2-out-of-2 leakage-resilient secret sharing which also feature non-malleability.
Recently, as the dual result of [GW17], which shows that by leaking one bit from each share, the
secret of the a Shamir scheme over finite field with characteristic 2 can be completely reconstructed,
Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai and Rabin [BDIR18] showed that the Shamir r-out-of-P secret
sharing scheme, when the underlying field is of a large prime order and for large values of r =
P −o(logP ) is leakage-resilient against a non-adaptive adversary who independently leaks bounded
amount of information from each share. Goyal and Kumar [GK18a, GK18b] constructed a 2-out-of-
P leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme as a building block for their constructions of non-malleable
secret sharing. Aggarwal et al. [ADN+18] proposed a construction for general access structure and
a new application to leakage-resilient threshold signatures. Several strengthened leakage-resilient
secret sharing models have been proposed. Srinivasan and Vasudevan [SV18] proposed a leakage
model for r-out-of-P threshold schemes, where the choice of each local leakage function can be
based on a choice of r − 2 shares. Kumar, Meka, and Sahai [KMS18] proposed a bounded length
multiple-round adaptive joint leakage model. The adversary can choose different unauthorized sets
of shares to jointly leak from them and output messages multiple times. Adaptive here means that
each time the choice of the unauthorized set and the leakage function are based on all previous
outputted messages. [FV19] (computational assumption) considered a noisy leakage model that,
instead of bounding the output length of the leakage functions, bounds the min-entropy of the share
conditioned on the output. See Table 1 for a summary of different models.
In the context of non-malleable codes, Agrawal et.al [AGM+15a] initiated the study of non-
compartmentalized tampering models. They considered non-malleability against permutation com-
posed with bit-wise independent tampering, and showed that non-malleable codes in such a tam-
pering model transform non-malleable bit-commitments into a non-malleable string-commitment.
They also gave a rate 1 construction for such non-malleable codes [AGM+15b]. There are a few
other non-compartmentalized tampering families studied for non-malleable codes: local functions
[CKR16], affine functions [CL17], small-depth circuits [BDG+18] and decision tree [BGW19]. In
particular, the affine tampering model not only includes the permutation composed with bit-wise
independent tampering of [AGM+15a, AGM+15b] as a special case, but also captures a much
stronger adversary than [AGM+15a, AGM+15b] and local tampering of [CKR16] in that each out-
put bit of a F2-affine function can depend on all input bits. In this sense, affine functions are
arguably the best example of the non-compartmentalized model.
There has not been non-compartmentalized tampering model studied in non-malleable secret
sharing. This is partly because currently known constructions of non-malleable secret sharing
crucially rely on the tools that only work for compartmentalised models (e.g. independent source
extractors and secret sharing schemes). Almost all constructions of non-malleable secret sharing
take the approach of building a compiler that transforms several plain secret sharing schemes with
various extra properties into a non-malleable secret sharing. It is not clear how resiliency against
a global tampering can be realized using this approach.
Dav`ı, Dziembowski and Venturi [DDV10], apart from constructing the first 2-out-of-2 leakage-
resilient secret sharing, proposed a general leakage model called Leakage-Resilient Storage (LRS),
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where there is an upper bound on the total output length and the leakage functions can be chosen
from a set L of functions that is only restricted by its cardinality |L|. The cardinality |L| can still
be exponential in the length of the encoding and functions computable by Boolean circuits of a
fixed size was given as an example for this model.
Again, there has not been non-compartmentalized leakage model studied for leakage-resiliency
for secret sharing. The leakage for secret sharing is usually modelled as an arbitrary function with
bounded output length applied to each share or up to a certain number of shares (but never the full
share vector) at one time. Note that arbitrary leakage functions, even with one bit output, applied
to the full share vector is impossible to resist since the reconstruction algorithm itself can be used
to construct a contradiction. Indeed, a counter example could be the reconstruction algorithm
outputting the first bit of the secret. It is not clear how the LRS with L only restricted by its
cardinality |L| can be realized for secret sharing.
Our contributions. We take inspiration from the definition of non-malleable (codes) secret
sharing and propose a general notion of leakage-resilient secret sharing with respect to a structured
family L of leakage functions and a total output size bound β, which is a non-negative integer. We
call a leakage adversary in this model a β-bounded L-leakage adversary. We fill the gap left open in
current state of leakage-resilient secret sharing by considering a structured non-compartmentalized
leakage family L. In particular, we focus on the family Laffine of F2-affine leakage functions and
design leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes against a β-bounded Laffine-leakage adversary. We
emphasize that each output bit of the leakage function can depend on all input bits, namely, the
full share vector. When the context is clear, we simply call it affine leakage-resilient secret sharing.
Definition (Informal). An r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-resilient secret sharing
is a r-out-of-P statistical secret sharing scheme that is also statistically leakage-resilient against a
β-bounded Laffine-leakage adversary. More concretely,
1. Correctness: given any r shares, the secret is correctly reconstructed with overwhelming prob-
ability, over the randomness of the sharing algorithm.
2. Privacy and Leakage-Resiliency:
• Non-adaptive adversary: any non-adaptive choice of r − 1 shares and the output of any
non-adaptive choice of affine leakage functions of the full share vector with total output
length bounded by β are statistically indistinguishable for any pair of distinct secrets.
• Adaptive adversary: any adaptive choice of r − 1 shares and the output of any adaptive
choice of affine leakage functions of the full share vector with total output length bounded
by β are statistically indistinguishable for any pair of distinct secrets. (The choice of the
r− 1 shares and the choice of the affine leakage functions can adaptively depend on each
other.)
Using the construction of optimal non-adaptive binary secret sharing in [LCG+19], we imme-
diately have a non-adaptive r-out-of-P statistical secret sharing with asymptotic information ratio
1. We are able to prove that by shortening the secret by β bits, the r-out-of-P statistical secret
sharing can be made leakage-resilient against a non-adaptive β-bounded Laffine-leakage adversary.
We then have the following.
Theorem (Informal). There is a non-adaptive r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-
resilient secret sharing for any constant r and P with secret length ℓ and information ratio ℓ+β+o(ℓ)ℓ .
We note that this information ratio is almost the best one can hope for. Intuitively, any r shares
contain the full information about the ℓ bits secret, while r− 1 shares among them do not contain
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any information. This means that the amount of secret information possible is the upper-bounded
by the length of one share. Now there are β bits information about these r shares leaked to an
unconditional adversary. The upper bound on the amount of secret information must reduce by β
bits. In other words, an information ratio of ℓ+βℓ would be the optimal.
One could use the construction of adaptive binary secret sharing in [LCG+19] to construct affine
leakage-resilient secret sharing. We propose a new construction that have a better information ratio.
As a result of independent interest, our construction of adaptive leakage-resilient secret sharing here
also gives an adaptive binary secret sharing with improved coding rate (see Related works for
more details).
Theorem (Informal). There is an adaptive r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-resilient
secret sharing for any constant r and P with secret length ℓ and constant information ratio.
We extend our affine leakage-resilient secret sharing model to a leakage-resilient non-malleable
secret sharing model. We again consider a general tampering family F that can possibly be non-
compartmentalized. We allow the tampering adversary to base the choice of the tampering function
f ∈ F on any unauthorised set of shares and the output of the L-leakage from the full share vector.
We call it affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing, when the tampering family F needs
not be specified.
Definition (Informal). An adaptive r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-resilient secret
sharing is said to be non-malleable with respect to a tampering family F if the following non-
malleability property is satisfied.
Non-malleability: for any up to r − 1 shares, any β-bounded Laffine-leakage adversary, any F-
tampering strategy σ and any reconstruction set R of size r, reconstructing from the set R of the
tampered shares yields the original secret or a value that follows a background distribution, where
the probability of the first case and the probability distribution in the second case are dictated by the
particular leakage adversary, the particular tampering strategy σ and the particular reconstruction
set R (all probabilities are taken over the randomness of the sharing algorithm).
The first family F of tampering functions we consider is the family Faffine of F2-affine tamper-
ing functions. By strengthening one of the building blocks of the adaptive binary secret sharing
construction in [LCG+19] to its “non-malleable counterpart” (from an affine extractor to an affine
non-malleable extractor, see Overview of constructions below for more information), we are
able to prove that the non-malleability property, in addition to correctness, privacy and leakage-
resiliency of affine leakage-resilient secret sharing, is satisfied. This gives us a leakage-resilient
non-malleable secret sharing fully in non-compartmentalized model. That is the leakage model is
Laffine and the tampering model is Faffine, both are non-compartmentalized.
Theorem (Informal). There is an adaptive r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-resilient
secret sharing for any constant r and big enough P that is non-malleable with respect to Faffine.
The above construction in fact proves a reduction from an affine leakage-resilient non-malleable
secret sharing with respect to Faffine to a special type of randomness extractor (affine non-malleable
extractor), an object in pseudo-randomness. We would be able to get explicit secret sharing schemes
for any constant r and P , once affine non-malleable extractors with better parameters (one that
can extract from any constant fraction of entropy) are explicitly constructed.
The second family F of tampering functions we consider is the family FBIT of Bit-wise Inde-
pendent Tampering (BIT) functions. Let q be the size of each share. A function f ∈ FBIT for a
6
secret sharing with P players is described by f = (f1, . . . , fP log q), where fi is a binary tampering
function belonging to {Set0,Set1,Keep,Flip}, where Set0 and Set1 set the value of the bit to 0 and
1, respectively, and Keep and Flip will keep and flip the bit, respectively. For this tampering family,
we are able to modify our construction of adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing to also
satisfy non-malleability, for any constants r and P .
Theorem (Informal). There is an adaptive r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-resilient
secret sharing for any constant r and P that is non-malleable with respect to Faffine.
Note that since the tampering function f ∈ F is chosen based on any up to r−1 shares and the
output of the leakage function, the non-malleable secret sharing model is in fact not weak even when
F = FBIT. In particular, the tampering at the r−1 shares chosen by the privacy adversary is similar
to joint tampering model, though the tampering at other shares is weaker than the leakage-resilient
version of independent tampering model. The modification we have here is similar to the one in the
construction for Faffine. We replace the linear seeded extractor with a linear seeded non-malleable
extractor (see Overview of constructions below for more information). Seeded non-malleable
extractors are under scrutiny in the past few years and many good constructions are known (just
to name a few [DW09, Li12, DLWZ14, CGL16b, Li17, Li18]). But as far as we know, only the inner
product construction of [Li12] gives a linear seeded non-malleable extractor. We then prove an
existence result concerning the linear seeded non-malleable extractors with our required properties
(one that can extract from less than one half of the entropy) and leave its explicit construction as
an interesting open problem.
Overview of constructions. A (t, r, P )-ramp scheme is defined with respect to two thresholds,
t and r. The knowledge of any t shares or fewer does not reveal any information about the secret.
On the other hand, any r shares can be used to reconstruct the secret. The subsets of size ≥ t+ 1
or ≤ r − 1 shares, may reveal some information about the secret. Note that the guarantee that
requires all subsets of participants be either authorized, or unauthorized is no longer be attained
when r − t > 1. We state our results in the language of (t, r, P )-ramp schemes and the results
specialised to threshold secret sharing mentioned above can be recovered by letting r − t = 1.
Affine leakage-resilient secret sharing. An extractor is a function that turns non-uniform distribu-
tions (called source) over the domain into an almost uniform distribution over the range (smaller in
size than the domain). An affine source is a flat distribution on an affine subspace and an extractor
for affine sources is called an affine extractor. An extractor is invertible if there is an efficient algo-
rithm that, given an extractor output, samples a pre-image for that output uniformly at random.
Very recently, Lin et.al. [LCG+19] proposed a construction of secret sharing through combining an
invertible affine extractor and a linear erasure correcting code. In their construction, the secret is
the output of the affine extractor. The sharing algorithm first uses the inverter of the extractor to
sample a random pre-image for the secret, then encodes the pre-image using the erasure correcting
code. The key observation is if we start with a uniformly distributed secret, the inverter will output
a distribution that is uniform over the domain of the extractor. The privacy analysis is focused on
this uniform pre-image. Now this pre-image is further encoded using the erasure correcting code to
yield the share vector. But since the erasure correcting code is linear, knowing several components
of its codeword and knowing several bits output of an affine function of its codeword amount to
putting several linear equations on the uniform pre-image, which is now flatly distributed on an
affine sub-space of the domain of the extractor, hence an affine source. If this affine source has
enough entropy, then the distribution of the uniform secret conditioned on the adversary’s view
remains uniform. This means that the adversary’s view and the secret are independent and hence
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privacy is provided. Using this construction, ramp secret sharing families with statistical privacy
and probabilistic reconstruction over binary shares can be constructed, given any relative privacy
threshold τ and relative reconstruction threshold ρ, for arbitrary constants 0 ≤ τ < ρ ≤ 1. Now
given a privacy threshold t and a reconstruction threshold r for a ramp scheme with P players, we
set τ = t/P and ρ = r/P , and obtain a family of binary ramp schemes with N -bit share vector,
where N is a multiple of P . We then divide the N -bit share vector into P blocks and call each
block a share of a (t, r, P )-ramp scheme.
Our construction of non-adaptive leakage-resilient secret sharing uses the same high level ideas
as described above but with a linear seeded extractor instead of a seedless one. A seeded extractor
is a function that takes a second input (called the seed) which is uniform and independent of
the source input. The interest in the use of seeded, as opposed to seedless affine, extractors is
twofold. First, nearly optimal and very efficient constructions of seeded extractors are known in
the literature that extract nearly the entire source entropy with only a short seed. This allows us
to attain nearly optimal rates for the non-adaptive case. Furthermore, and crucially, such nearly
optimal extractor constructions (in particular, Trevisan’s extractor [Tre01, RRV02]) can in fact
be linear functions for every fixed choice of the seed (in contrast, seedless affine extractors can
never be linear functions). We take advantage of the linearity of the extractor in a crucial way and
use a rather delicate analysis to show that in fact the linearity of the extractor can be utilized to
prove that the resulting secret sharing scheme provides the stringent worst-case secret guarantee.
The construction and its proof follows similarly as the optimal construction of binary non-adaptive
secret sharing in [LCG+19].
Our construction of adaptive leakage-resilient secret sharing uses a classical paradigm of com-
bining a seedless extractor with a seeded extractor [Sha06]. The seedless extractor extracts a short
seed for the seeded extractor and the combination is in effect a seedless extractor with the good
properties of the seeded extractor. Unfortunately, the asymptotic optimal property that is en-
joyed by the seeded extractor based construction above is not preserved due to an error bounding
process that also involves the affine extractor. It is an interesting open problem that whether
this slack can be tighten. Nevertheless, using this classical paradigm gives us significantly better
parameters, which also has independent interest in secret sharing over small constant share size
[CCX13, BGK16, LCG+19]. We in fact obtain, as a side result, an explicit secret sharing against
an adaptive adversary with significantly better parameters than [LCG+19] (see Related works).
The improvement comes from making good use of the linearity of the seeded extractor and a more
efficient way of inverting the extractor that exploits this classical structure.
Affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing. In a nut shell, our constructions start with
the extractor based construction of secret sharing scheme and strengthen the extractor towards
obtaining non-malleability. This idea is inspired by the following extractor based construction of
non-malleable codes. An important theoretical discovery in constructions of non-malleable codes
is the connection between non-malleable codes and invertible seedless non-malleable extractors by
Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG17]. A seedless non-malleable extractor is defined with respect to
a family of tampering functions, which are applied to the input of the extractor. Non-malleability
here means that the output corresponding to the original input is independent of the output of a
tampered input. Intuitively, if one uses the extractor as the decoder then non-malleability of the
obtained code follows naturally from the independence of the two outcomes. This connection plays
an important role in the construction of C-split state non-malleable codes [CZ14, CGL16a, Li17,
Li18, CL18]. This result was recently extended to affine tampering functions through explicitly
constructing seedless non-malleable extractors with respect to affine tampering functions [CL17].
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Our construction of adaptive affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing with respect to
Faffine strengthens the affine extractor to an affine non-malleable extractor. Intuitively, we trivially
have an affine leakage-resilient secret sharing scheme, since an affine non-malleable extractor is in
particular an affine extractor. We can further show that the scheme is non-malleableThe analysis
is again focused on the uniform pre-image (of a uniform secret) generated by the inverter of the
extractor. As argued before, conditioned on a view v of the t shares and β-bounded affine leakage
adversary A, the uniform pre-image becomes an affine source. Under the same conditioning, the
affine tampering strategy σ outputs the corresponding affine tampering function f v that is applied
to the share vector. Due to the linearity of the erasure correcting code, this f v induces an affine
tampering function g that is in effect applied to the pre-image we are investigating. If the extractor
can non-malleably (with respect to affine functions) extract from the affine source, the tampered
outcome is independent of the original secret. We then obtain a clean reduction from affine leakage-
resilient non-malleable secret sharing to affine non-malleable extractors (see Theorem 24).
Our construction of adaptive affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing with respect
to FBIT is built on the particular adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing construction above.
We strengthen the linear seeded extractor to a linear seeded non-malleable extractor. Seeded non-
malleable extractors were proposed (in fact before the notion of seedless non-malleable extractors)
for application in privacy amplification over public unauthenticated discussion [DW09]. A seeded
non-malleable extractor is very different from its seedless counterpart and the only thing that these
two objects have in common is to achieve independence of the original extractor output from the
tampered extractor output. The first difference lies in what is tampered. The source of the seeded
extractor is not tampered, it is its seed that is tampered. The second difference lies in what
tampering is allowed. The seed tampering of the seeded extractor is not restricted by a family
of functions, but is allowed to be any tampering function as long as it does not have any fixed
points. We overcome the first difference through suitably conditioning on some event such that
the tampered source is equal to the original source adding a constant offset, thanks to restriction
to FBIT ⊂ Faffine. Since the seeded non-malleable extractor is linear, we can separate the constant
offset from the tampered source completely and reduce to the same source situation. We overcome
the second difference through detecting the tampering, whenever the tampered seed coincides the
original seed, using an Algebraic Manipulation Detection AMD [CDF+08] pre-coding of the secret.
We can not guarantee that the tampered share vector always leads to a seed different from the
original seed. But when the two seeds do coincide, as mentioned a few lines ago, the linearity of the
non-malleable extractor allows for separating out an additive offset. This results in reconstructing
an (obliviously) additively tampered secret, which is easily detected using, for example, the AMD
code [CDF+08].
Related works.
Another line of works related to the current work is the study of ramp secret sharing over
a constant share size q. The main characteristics of this line of works are fixed share size q,
unconstrained number N of players and ramp parameters (t, r) satisfying t = τN , r = ρN . The
goal is minimizing the relative threshold gap γ = gN =
r−t
N = ρ − τ . It is shown in [CCX13]
and [BGK16] that for 0 < t < N − 1,
g ≥ (N + 2)/(2q − 1).
This means that once q is fixed, the relative gap γ = gN >
1
2q−1 . In particular, when q = 2, we must
have γ > 1/3. This constraint is recently showed avoidable once the perfect privacy and perfect
reconstruction of the ramp secret sharing are relaxed to statistical privacy (any t shares from a pair
of secrets have a statistical distance negligible in N) and probabilistic reconstruction (reconstruction
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with r shares has a failure probability that is negligible in N), respectively [LCG+19]. It is shown
that for any 0 ≤ τ < ρ ≤ 1, ramp secret sharing families (with relaxed privacy and reconstruction)
can be explicitly constructed such that the privacy threshold t = τN and the reconstruction
threshold r = ρN . The non-perfect privacy brings out the distinction between an adaptive reading
adversary and a non-adaptive reading adversary. The authors then give two constructions for these
two types of reading adversaries, respectively. In particular, the construction for non-adaptive
adversary shares a secret of N(ρ−τ−o(1)) log q bits, which they show is optimal. The construction
for adaptive adversary does not achieve this secret length and the authors leave improving the secret
length as an open problem. As mentioned previously, the tools developed in our second construction
of affine leakage resilient secret sharing can be used to significantly improve the secret length of
the construction in [LCG+19]. In particular, a coding rate (ℓ/N) was used as the design criterion
and shown to be upper-bounded by ρ − τ . The coding rate is related to the information ratio in
the current work as follows.
Information ratio =
N/P
ℓ
=
1/P
coding rate
.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains the definitions of various
randomness extractors that appear in this work. Section 3 contains two constructions of affine
leakage-resilient secret sharing, for non-adaptive adversary and adaptive adversary, respectively.
Section 4 contains two constructions of adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing that are
non-malleable with respect to affine tampering and bit-wise independent tampering, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
Coding schemes define the basic properties for codes (schemes) that are used in cryptography. Let
⊥ denote a special symbol that means detection.
Definition 1 ([DPW18]). A (k, n)-coding scheme consists of two polynomial-time functions: a
randomised encoding function Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n, where the randomness is implicit, and a
deterministic decoding function Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥} such that, for each m ∈ {0, 1}k ,
Pr[Dec(Enc(m)) = m] = 1 (correctness), and the probability is over the randomness of the encoding
algorithm.
The statistical distance of two random variables (their corresponding distributions) is defined
as follows. For X,Y ← Ω,
SD(X;Y) =
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|Pr(X = ω)− Pr(Y = ω)|.
We say X and Y are ε-close (denoted X
ε
∼ Y) if SD(X,Y) ≤ ε.
A tampering function for a (k, n)-coding scheme is a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
Definition 2 ([DPW18]). Let F be a family of tampering functions. For each f ∈ F and m ∈
{0, 1}k , define the tampering-experiment
Tamperfm =
{
x← Enc(m), x˜ = f(x), m˜ = Dec(x˜)
Output m˜,
}
.
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which is a random variable over the randomness of the encoding function Enc. A coding scheme
(Enc,Dec) is non-malleable with respect to F if for each f ∈ F , there exists a distribution Df over
the set {0, 1}k
⋃
{⊥, same∗}, such that, for all m ∈ {0, 1}k , we have:
Tamperfm
ε
∼
{
m˜← Df
Output m if m˜ = same∗, and m˜ otherwise;
}
(1)
and Df is efficiently samplable given oracle access to f(·).
The right hand side of (1) is sometimes denoted by Copy(Df ,m). Using this notation, (1) can
be written as,
Tamperfm
ε
∼ Copy(Df ,m). (1’)
The following coding scheme, originally proposed for constructing robust secret sharing, is
frequently used as a building block for constructing non-malleable codes.
Definition 3 ([CDF+08]). Let (AMDenc,AMDdec) be a coding scheme with AMDenc : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}n. We say that (AMDenc,AMDdec) is a δ-secure Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD)
code if for all m ∈ {0, 1}k and all non-zero ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n, we have Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m) + ∆) /∈
{m,⊥}] ≤ δ, where the probability is over the randomness of the encoding.
An explicit optimal construction of AMD code is given in [CDF+08] that in fact gives a tamper
detection code [JW15]. We say an AMD code achieves δ-tamper detection security if for all ∆ 6= 0n,
Pr[AMDdec(AMDenc(m) + ∆) 6= ⊥] ≤ δ.
We use various types of randomness extractors in our constructions. Randomness extractors
extract close to uniform bits from input sequences that are not uniform but have some guaranteed
entropy. See [NZ96] and references there in for more information about randomness extractors.
A randomness source is a random variable with lower bound on its min-entropy, which is defined
by H∞(X) = − logmaxx{Pr[X = x]}. We say a random variable X ← {0, 1}
n is a (n, k)-source, if
H∞(X) ≥ k. For well structured sources, there exist deterministic functions that can extract close
to uniform bits. An affine (n, k)-source is a random variable that is uniformly distributed on an
affine translation of some k-dimensional sub-space of {0, 1}n. Let Um denote the random variable
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m.
Definition 4. A function aExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an affine (k, ε)-extractor if for any affine
(n, k)-source X, we have
SD(aExt(X);Um) ≤ ε.
We will use Bourgain’s affine extractor (or the alternative [Li11] due to Li) in our constructions.
Lemma 5 ([Bou07]). For every constant 0 < µ ≤ 1, there is an explicit affine extractor aExt : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m for affine (n, nµ)-sources with output length m = Ω(n) and error at most 2−Ω(n).
For general (n, k)-sources, there does not exist a deterministic function that can extract close
to uniform bits from all of them simultaneously. A family of deterministic functions are needed.
Definition 6. A function Ext : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a strong seeded (k, ε)-extractor if for
any (n, k)-source X, we have
SD(S,Ext(S,X);S,Um) ≤ ε,
where S is chosen uniformly from {0, 1}d. A seeded extractor Ext(·, ·) is called linear if for any fixed
seed S = s, the function Ext(s, ·) is a linear function.
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There are linear seeded extractors that extract all the randomness, for example, the Trevisan’s
extractor [Tre01]. In particular, we use the following improvement of this extractor due to Raz,
Reingold and Vadhan [RRV02].
Lemma 7 ([RRV02]). There is an explicit linear strong (k, ε)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m with d = O(log3(n/ε)) and m = k −O(d).
Non-malleability of randomness extractors captures their tolerance against tampering. It was
first defined for seeded extractors by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] with application in privacy amplifi-
cation over public and unauthenticated discussion. The tampering considered is an arbitrary seed
tampering that does not have any fixed point.
Definition 8 ([DW09]). A seeded (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor is a function nmExt : {0, 1}d ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m such that given any (n, k)-source X, an independent uniform seed Z ∈ {0, 1}d,
for any (deterministic) function A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d such that A(z) 6= z for any z, we have
SD(Z, nmExt(A(Z),X), nmExt(Z,X);Z, nmExt(A(Z),X),Um) ≤ ε. (2)
Non-malleable seedless extractors were proposed by Cheraghchi and Guruswami for constructing
non-malleable codes. The tampering now is a source tampering and is restricted to a particular
tampering family.
Definition 9 ([CG17]). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-seedless non-malleable
extractor with respect to a class X of sources over {0, 1}n and a class F of tampering functions
acting on {0, 1}n, if for every X ∈ X with min-entropy k and every f ∈ F , there is a distribution
Df over {0, 1}
m ∪ {same∗} such that for an independent Y sampled from Df , we have
SD(nmExt(f(X), nmExt(X);Copy(Y,Um),Um) ≤ ε, (3)
where the two copies of Um denote the same random variable and Copy(y, u) = y always except
when y = same∗, in which case it outputs u.
We will use Chattopadhyay and Li’s affine non-malleable extractor. We first give the restricted
form of the extractor, where the source tampering function does not have any fixed points.
Lemma 10 ([CL17]). For all n, k > 0, any δ > 0 and k ≥ n − n
δ
2 , there exists an efficient
function anmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = nΩ(1), such that if X is an affine (n, k)-source and
A : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is an affine function with no fixed point, then
SD(anmExt(A(X)), anmExt(X); anmExt(A(X)),Um) ≤ 2
−nΩ(1) .
Let Faffine be the set of tampering functions from {0, 1}
n to {0, 1}n where each output bit is an
affine function of the input bits. The affine non-malleable extractors in Lemma 10 can be easiliy
converted into a seedless non-malleable extractor with respect to Faffine.
Lemma 11 ([CL17]). Let anmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a (k − η, ε)-non-malleable extractor for
affine sources, with respect to affine tampering functions with on fixed points. Then anmExt is a
(k, ε + (n + 1)2−η)-non-malleable extractor for affine sources, with respect to Faffine.
Explicit constructions of randomness extractors have efficient forward direction of extraction.
In some applications, we usually need to efficiently invert the process: Given an extractor output,
sample a random pre-image. This is not necessarily efficient if the extractor is not a linear function,
in which case we need to explicitly construct an invertible extractor. If the extractor is linear,
sampling a random pre-image can be done in polynomial time. In general,
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Definition 12 ([CDS12]). Let f be a mapping from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m. For v ≥ 0, a function
Inv : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n is called a v-inverter for f if the following conditions hold:
• (Inversion) Given y ∈ {0, 1}m such that its pre-image f−1(y) is nonempty, for every r ∈ {0, 1}r
we have f(Inv(y, r)) = y.
• (Uniformity) Inv(Um,Ur) is µ-close to Un.
A µ-inverter is called efficient if there is a randomized algorithm that runs in worst-case polynomial
time and, given y ∈ {0, 1}m and r as a random seed, computes Inv(y, r). We call a mapping µ-
invertible if it has an efficient µ-inverter, and drop the prefix µ from the notation when it is zero.
We abuse the notation and denote the inverter of f by f−1.
Finally, we need the following simple lemma whose proof can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 13. Let V,V′ be two random variables distributed over the set V and W,W′ over W
satisfying SD(V,W;V′,W′) ≤ ε. Let E ⊂ W be an event. Then we have the following.
SD(V|W ∈ E ;V′|W′ ∈ E) ≤
2ε
Pr[W′ ∈ E ]
.
A stochastic code has a randomised encoder and a deterministic decoder. The encoder Enc : {0, 1}m×
R → {0, 1}n uses local randomness R ← R to encode a message m ∈ {0, 1}m. The decoder is a
deterministic function Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m ∪ {⊥}. The decoding probability is defined over the
encoding randomness R ← R. Stochastic codes are known to explicitly achieve the capacity of
some special adversarial channels [GS16].
Affine sources play an important role in our constructions. We define a general requirement for
the stochastic code used in our constructions.
Definition 14 ([LCG+19]). Let Enc : {0, 1}m ×R → {0, 1}n be the encoder of a stochastic code.
We say it is a stochastic affine code if for any r ∈ R, the encoding function Enc(·, r) specified by r
is an affine function of the message. That is we have
Enc(m, r) = mGr +∆r,
where Gr ∈ {0, 1}
m×n and ∆r ∈ {0, 1}
n are specified by the randomness r.
We then adapt a construction in [GS16] to obtain the following capacity-achieving Stochastic
Affine-Erasure Correcting Code (SA-ECC). In particular, we show for any p ∈ [0, 1), there is an
explicit stochastic affine code that corrects p fraction of adversarial erasures and achieves the rate
1− p.
Lemma 15 ([LCG+19]). For every p ∈ [0, 1), and every ξ > 0, there is an efficiently encod-
able and decodable stochastic affine code (Enc,Dec) with rate R = 1 − p − ξ such that for ev-
ery m ∈ {0, 1}NR and erasure pattern of at most p fraction, we have Pr[Dec(E˜nc(m)) = m] ≥
1 − exp(−Ω(ξ2N/ log2N)), where E˜nc(m) denotes the partially erased random codeword and N
denotes the length of the codeword.
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3 Affine Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
In this section, we study a new leakage model for secret sharing. All results are stated as (t, r, P )-
ramp schemes. The special results concerning r-out-of-P threshold schemes can be recovered
through letting t = r − 1. We start with recalling the Leakage-Resilient Storage (LRS) model
of [DDV10].
A leakage-resilient storage scheme is a pair (Enc,Dec), where Enc : {0, 1}ℓ × R → {0, 1}N is a
randomised, efficiently computable function (R is the randomness set) and Enc : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}N is
a deterministic, efficiently computable function. Consider the following game between an adversary
A and an oracle O.
1. The adversary A chooses a pair of messages m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ and sends them to the oracle O.
2. The oracle O chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and compute Enc(mb).
3. The following is executed θ times, for i = 1, . . . , θ:
(a) A selects a function li : {0, 1}
N → {0, 1}ci from a set L of functions, and sends it to O,
(b) O sends li(Enc(mb)) to A. This is called A retrieves ci bits through L-leakage.
We will call the adversary A a β-bounded L-leakage adversary if
∑θ
i=1 ci ≤ β.
We consider statistical secret sharing, where the privacy with respect to a given access structure
is defined using indistinguishability of unauthorised set of shares for a pair of secrets. The privacy
adversary’s choice of shares may be non-adaptive or adaptive, which become different notions when
the privacy error is non-zero. We want to consider leakage-resiliency for statistical secret sharing
on top of the privacy with respect to a given access structure. We now view the full share vector of
the secret sharing for P players as an encoding of a secret s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ (the sharing algorithm being
the randomised encoder) in the codeword space {0, 1}N , where N = P log q and q is the share size.
A non-compartmentalized leakage model means that the set L contains leakage functions whose
outputs can depend on all parts of the full share vector. Inspired by the non-compartmentalized
tampering models considered in the non-malleable codes literature, we study the set Laffine of F2-
affine leakage functions. Each output bit of a F2-affine leakage function l : {0, 1}
N → {0, 1}c is an
affine function of the input in {0, 1}N .
Definition 16. For integers 0 ≤ t < r ≤ P , a (ε(N), δ(N))-statistical secret sharing for ramp
parameters (t, r, P ) that is leakage-resilient against a β-bounded Laffine-leakage adversary is a pair
of polynomial-time algorithms (Share,Recst),
Share : {0, 1}ℓ(N) ×R → {0, 1}N , P |N
where R denotes the randomness set, and for any reconstruction set R ⊂ P of size |R| = r,
RecstR :
(
{0, 1}N/P
)r
→ {0, 1}ℓ(N) ∪ {⊥},
that satisfy the following properties.
• Correctness: Given any r out of the P blocks of the share vector Share(s), the reconstruct
algorithm Recst reconstructs the secret s with probability at least 1− δ(N).
• Privacy and leakage-resiliency:
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– Non-adaptive adversary: for any pair s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(N) of secrets, any A ⊂ P of size
|A| ≤ t, any affine leakage function l : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}c with c ≤ β,
SD(l(Share(s0)),Share(s0)A; l(Share(s1)),Share(s1)A) ≤ ε(N), (4)
where Share(s)A denotes the projection of Share(s) ∈
(
{0, 1}N/P
)P
on the blocks specified
by A.
– Adaptive adversary: For any s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ(N) and any adaptive adversary Aβ,affine that
is β-bounded and affine,
SD
(
View
O(Share(s0))
Aβ,affine
;View
O(Share(s1))
Aβ,affine
)
≤ ε(N), (5)
where View
O(Share(s))
Aβ,affine
denotes the view of the adversary Aβ,affine after playing the LRS
game described above with the oracle O and, at any time, can adaptively select up to t
shares to append to the messages retrieved from O(Share(s)).
When it is clear from the context, instead of ε(N), δ(N), ℓ(N), we write ε, δ, ℓ.
In the sequel, we simply refer to the objects defined in Definition 16 non-adaptive/adaptive
affine leakage-resilient secret sharing.
3.1 Non-adaptive Affine Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
We first give a construction of non-adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing.
Theorem 17. Let Ext : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ be a linear strong seeded (n − τN − β, ε8)-
extractor and Ext−1(z, ·) : {0, 1}ℓ ×R1 → {0, 1}
n be the inverter of the function Ext(z, ·) that maps
an s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to one of its pre-images chosen uniformly at random. Let (SA-ECCenc,SA-ECCdec) be
a stochastic affine-erasure correcting code with the encoder SA-ECCenc : {0, 1}d+n ×R2 → {0, 1}
N
that tolerates N − ρN bit erasures and decodes with success probability at least 1 − δ. Then
the following coding scheme (Share,Recst) is a non-adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing
with security parameters ε, δ, leakage bound β and ramp parameters (t, r, P ) such that τ = t/P ,
ρ = r/P . {
Share(s) = SA-ECCenc(Z||Ext−1(Z, s)),where Z
$
← {0, 1}d;
Recst(y˜) = Ext(z, x),where (z||x) = SA-ECCdec(y˜).
Here y˜ denotes an incomplete version of a share vector y ∈ {0, 1}N with some of its components
replaced by erasure symbols.
The proof is similar to the proof for the optimal construction of non-adaptive binary ramp
scheme in [LCG+19] and is given in Appendix B for completeness. We provide the intuition of the
construction here, starting with the high-level idea with an affine extractor aExt, which is shared
by our new construction for adaptive adversary in the next subsection.
Intuitively, the SA-ECC enables the reconstruction from any ρN bits. The privacy for any
τN shares is not as straightforward. Imagine we share a uniformly distributed random secret
S
$
← {0, 1}ℓ and want to find out the distribution of the secret conditioned on the adversary’s view
V, which is consist of up to t shares and up to β bits retrieved through applying an affine leakage
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function. Intuitively, if the distribution of the uniform secret conditioned on V remains uniform, we
have privacy and leakage-resiliency. Since we are using extractors to extract uniform distribution,
the focus is then to make sure the source has enough entropy and is of the right structure (affine
source). According to the definition of an inverter, if the secret has uniform distribution Uℓ, then
the inverter outputs a uniform distribution Un.
Un
µ
∼ aExt−1(Uℓ).
On the other hand, in the construction, the source is the message of the SA-ECC, which is an affine
function. Obtaining any τN bits of the SA-ECC codeword is equivalent to applying an affine function
of τN -bit output to the source. Moreover, applying an affine leakage function l : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}β
to the SA-ECC codeword is equivalent to applying the composition l ◦ SA-ECC to the source. An
affine function induces a partition of the space {0, 1}n into cosets each corresponding to a particular
value of the adversary’s view V = v. Given that the adversary observes V = v, the message of
SA-ECC can only be one element in the coset corresponding to v. This confirms that the source
is a flat distribution on an affine subspace in {0, 1}n, hence an affine source. The entropy of the
affine source is then the dimension of the affine space, which is at least n − τN − β. Since this is
true for any V = v, one has the following
(V, aExt(Un))
εA∼ (V,Uℓ),
where εA is the error (measured in statistical distance) of the extractor aExt. Finally, the privacy
and leakage-resiliency error is the statistical distance between two views V0 and V1 that are cor-
responding to a pair of secrets s0 and s1, respectively. One can use the above bound for uniform
secret to obtain the following bound for any secret s (using Lemma 13 for example).
(V|aExt(Un) = s)
2ℓ·εA∼ V. (6)
Observe that V0 = (V|aExt(Un) = s0) and V1 = (V|aExt(Un) = s1). They are both (2
ℓ · εA + µ)-
close to the distribution of V. It then follows that the privacy and leakage-resiliency error is
ε = 2ℓ+1 · εA + 2µ.
The construction in Theorem 17 uses a linear seeded extractor instead of an affine extractor to
avoid the exponential grow (from εA to 2
ℓ · εA) of errors (see the proof in [LCG
+19]). But also
because of the use of the seeded extractor, which only provides security when the seed is independent
of the source, one can only prove privacy and leakage-resiliency for non-adaptive adversary.
We now analyze the information ratio of the non-adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing
(we let t = r − 1 to have a threshold secret sharing) constructed in Theorem 17 when instantiated
with the SA-ECC from Lemma 15 and the Ext from Lemma 7. The secret length is ℓ = n − τN −
β − O(d), where the seed length is d = O(log3(2n/ε)). The SA-ECC encodes d + n bits to N
bits and with coding rate RECC = ρ − ξ for a small ξ determined by δ (satisfying the relation
δ = exp(−Ω(ξ2N/ log2N)) according to Lemma 15). We then have n = N(ρ− ξ)− d, resulting in
the information ratio
N/P
ℓ
=
N/P
n− τN − β −O(d)
=
N/P
N(ρ− ξ)− τN − β −O(d)
=
N/P
N(ρ− τ)− β − (ξN +O(d))
,
where by letting t = r − 1, we have ρ − τ = (r − t)/P = 1/P and hence the information ratio is
ℓ+β+o(ℓ)
ℓ .
Corollary 18. There is a non-adaptive r-out-of-P statistical β-bounded affine leakage-resilient
secret sharing for any constant r and P with secret length ℓ and information ratio ℓ+β+o(ℓ)ℓ and the
security parameters ε and δ are both negligible in ℓ.
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3.2 Adaptive Affine Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing
We now provide a different way of reducing the explosion of error in (6), which does not sacrifice
resiliency against an adaptive adversary.
We first recall a classical framework of constructing seedless extractors from seeded extractors.
Seeded extractors are known to explicitly extract all the entropy and are not restricted by source
structures. Moreover, there are known constructions of linear seeded extractors perform almost as
well as the best seeded extractors. The elegant idea of this framework is to use a seedless extractor
to extract a short output from the structured source, which then serves as the seed for a seeded
extractor to extract all the entropy from the same source. For this idea to work, the dependence
of the extracted seed on the source has to be carefully analyzed (and removed).
Lemma 19 ([Sha06]). Let C be a class of distributions over {0, 1}n. Let E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}d be a
seedless extractor for C with error ǫ. Let F : {0, 1}d ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. Let X be a distribution in
C and assume that for every z ∈ {0, 1}d and y ∈ {0, 1}m, the distribution (X|F(z,X) = y) belongs
to C. Then
SD(E(X),F(E(X),X);Ud,F(Ud,X)) ≤ 2
d+3ǫ.
An example of such a class of distributions is the affine source, in which case we can use an
affine extractor F = aExt and a linear seeded extractor E = Ext. An affine source X conditioned on
Ext(z,X) = y, which amounts to a set of linear equations, is still an affine source for aExt. With
appropriate choice of parameters, we obtain a better affine extractor aExt′(X) : = Ext(aExt(X),X).
With an increase of d bits in the input, we have the following invertible affine extractor.
aExt′′(Sd||X) : = Ext(aExt(X) + Sd,X),
whose inverter is (aExt′′)−1(s) : =
(
aExt(Ext−1(Z, s)) + Z||Ext−1(Z, s)
)
, where Z
$
← {0, 1}d.
Theorem 20. Let aExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}d be a (n − τN − β − ℓ, εA)-affine extractor. Let
Ext : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ be a linear (n − τN − β − d, εE)-strong extractor with εE <
1
8 .
Let SA-ECCenc : {0, 1}d+n → {0, 1}N be the encoder of a statistical affine erasure correcting code
SA-ECC that corrects (1− ρ)N erasures with error probability δ. Let

Share(s) = SA-ECCenc(Sd||X), where X
$
← Ext−1(Z, s) and
Sd = Z+ aExt(X) with Z
$
← {0, 1}d
Recst(y˜) = Ext(aExt(x˜) + s˜d, x˜), where (s˜d||x˜) = SA-ECCdec(y˜),
Here y˜ denotes an incomplete version of a share vector y ∈ {0, 1}N with some of its components
replaced by erasure symbols. Let ε = 2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)+2εA+8εE . Then the coding scheme (Share,Recst)
is an adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing with security parameters ε, δ, leakage bound β
and ramp parameters (t, r, P ) such that τ = t/P , ρ = r/P .
Proof. Reconstruction from any r shares follows from the functionality of SA-ECC and the invert-
ibility guarantee of the invertible extractor, which insures that any correctly recovered pre-image
is mapped back to the original secret.
We next prove privacy and leakage resiliency. Consider a uniform secret Uℓ. By the uniformity
guarantee of the inverter, we have Share(Uℓ) = SA-ECCenc(Sd||Un). Our analysis is done for any
fixed Sd = sd. This captures a stronger adversary who on top of adaptively reading t shares, also
has access to Sd through an oracle. It is easy to see that the fixing of Sd = sd does not alter the
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distribution of the source Un, which remains uniform over {0, 1}
n. Let V : = View
O(SA-ECCenc(sd||Un))
Aβ,affine
denote the view of the adversary Aβ,affine on the encoding of a uniform source for the fixed Sd = sd.
Let Z : = aExt(Un) + sd denote the seed of the strong linear extractor Ext. Finally, let S : =
Ext(Z,Un). We study the random variable tuple (V,Z,S) to complete the proof.
The pair (Z,S)|V = v for any fixed V = v is by definition (aExt(Un) + sd,Ext(aExt(Un) +
sd,Un))|V = v. Since (Un|V = v) is an affine source with at least n− τN − β entropy, according to
Lemma 19, we have
(Z,S)|V = v
2d+3εA∼ (Ud,Ext(Ud,Un))|V = v.
Our concern is the relation between S and V, and therefore would like to further condition on values
of Z. In this step, we crucially use the linearity of Ext and the underlying linear space structure
of the affine source Un|V = v to claim that there is a subset G ⊂ {0, 1}
d of good seeds such that
Pr[Ud ∈ G] ≥ 1 − 4εE and for any z ∈ G, the distribution of Ext(z,Un)|V = v is exactly uniform.
This is true because Ext(z,Un)|V = v is an affine source. If its entropy is ℓ, then it is exactly
uniform. If its entropy is less than ℓ, its statistical distance εzE from uniform is at least
1
2 . Using
an averaging argument we have that at least 1 − 4εE fraction of the seeds should satisfy ε
z
E <
1
4 ,
and hence εzE = 0. We then use Lemma 13 with respect to the event Z ∈ G to claim that
(S|(V = v,Z ∈ G))
2d+4εA
1−4εE∼ (Ext(Ud,X)|(V = v,Ud ∈ G)),
where the right hand side is exactly Uℓ. Note that the subset G is determined by the indices of the
t shares and by the leakage adversary Aβ,affine, hence remains the same for any value of V = v. We
then have
((V,S)|Z ∈ G)
2d+4εA
1−4εE∼ (V,Uℓ).
Another application of Lemma 13 with respect to the event S = s gives
(V|(Z ∈ G,S = s))
2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1−4εE∼ V.
We finally bound the privacy and leakage-resiliency error as follows.
SD((V|S = s0); (V|S = s1))
≤ 2SD((V|S = s);V)
= 2Pr[Z ∈ G] · SD((V|(Z ∈ G,S = s));V) + 2Pr[Z /∈ G] · SD((V|(Z /∈ G,S = s));V)
≤ 2
(
1 · 2
(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1−4εE
+ (4εE + εA) · 1
)
< 2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)+2εA + 8εE .
Remark 21. Note that in the error bound 2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)+2εA + 8εE above, the exponential term
2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)+2 only appears as the multiplier of εA, the error of aExt. There are known constructions
of affine extractor that can extract from any constant fraction of entropy with error exponentially
small in the entropy (see Lemma 5). Instantiate aExt with such an affine extractor and Ext with
Trevisan’s seeded extractor (see Lemma 7), we have an explicit construction that provide negligible
error with seed length d negligible in ℓ. This adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing has
better information ratio (both constant) than the one constructed using aExt alone. When used
alone, one has to make aExt invertible using a One-Time-Pad trick (see [LCG+19]) that costs ℓ bits
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increase in the input. So the information ratio is (ℓ+n)/RECCPℓ , where RECC is the rate of the erasure
correcting code. Recall that making aExt′(·) = Ext(aExt(·), ·) invertible only costs d bits, which is
negligible in ℓ if we use the linear seeded extractor from Lemma 7. We then have information ratio
(d+n)/RECC
Pℓ ≈
n/RECC
Pℓ , for the same level of privacy and reconstruction errors.
4 Affine Leakage-Resilient Non-Malleable Secret Sharing
We now extend our model of leakage-resilient secret sharing to the paradigm of leakage-resilient
non-malleable secret sharing initiated in [KMS18]. Let V : = View
O(Share(s))
Aβ,affine
be the view of an
adaptive β-bounded affine adversary Aβ,affine as defined in Definition 16. A F-tampering strategy
associated with Aβ,affine is a metafunction
σ :
(
{0, 1}N/P
)t
× {0, 1}β → F
that takes as input a view V = v and outputs a tampering function f v ∈ F .
Definition 22. For integers 0 ≤ t < r ≤ P , an adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing
with security parameters ε(N), δ(N), leakage bound β and ramp parameters (t, r, P ) is said to be
non-malleable with respect to a family F of tampering functions from {0, 1}N to {0, 1}N , if the
following property is satisfied. Let the secret sharing scheme (Share,Recst) be as follows.
Share : {0, 1}ℓ(N) ×R → {0, 1}N , P |N,
where R denote the randomness set, and for any R ⊂ P of size |R| = r, there is a
RecstR :
(
{0, 1}N/P
)r
→ {0, 1}ℓ(N) ∪ {⊥}.
• Non-malleability: For any adaptive β-bounded affine leakage adversary Aβ,affine, any F-
tampering strategy σ associate with Aβ,affine, any R ⊂ P of size |R| = r and any secret
s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(N), define the tampering-experiment
Tamper
Aβ,affine,σ,R
s =


c← Share(s)
v = View
O(c)
Aβ,affine
, f v = σ(v), c˜ = f v(c)
s˜ = RecstR(c˜R)
Output s˜.


,
which is a random variable over the randomness of the share algorithm Share. We say the
scheme is ε(N)-non-malleable if for any Aβ,affine, σ, R and s, there exists a distribution
DAβ,affine,σ,R over the set {0, 1}
ℓ(N) ∪ {⊥} ∪ {same∗} such that
Tamper
Aβ,affine,σ,R
s
ε(N)
∼ Copy(DAβ,affine,σ,R, s), (7)
where Copy(·, ·) is as defined in (3).
When it is clear from the context, instead of ε(N), δ(N), ℓ(N), we write ε, δ, ℓ.
The general approach we take in constructing affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret shar-
ing in this work is to start with our adaptive affine leakage-resilient secret sharing construction in
previous section and consider how to strengthen it for providing non-malleability.
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Recall that the idea behind the constructions of affine leakage-resilient secret sharing in the
previous section can be summarized as identifying an affine source and managing the extractor
error (see Section 3.1). The analysis is focused on the message of the erasure correcting code, which
is at the same time the source of the affine extractor aExt. The block-wise projection function and
the affine leakage function applied to the share vector induces an affine leakage on the source of
aExt. For non-malleability, we similarly consider the tampering on the source of aExt induced by the
share vector tampering using functions from the family F . There are a few factors we need to take
into account while mimicking the analysis for leakage-resilience. Firstly, leakage-resilience is defined
only concerning the encoder (here sharing algorithm) of the coding scheme while tamper resilience
(e.g. non-malleability) involves both the encoder and the decoder. In this case, the induced source
tampering should take the decoding process (here reconstruction algorithm) into account. Secondly,
the reconstruction algorithm of a secret sharing only takes r shares and hence the induced source
tampering depends on which r (tampered) shares take part in the reconstruction. Finally, the
share vector tampering in Definition 22 is chosen based on the view of the leakage adversary. We
should also take that into account. We first formerly define the concept of an induced tampering
for analysing secret sharing that uses an erasure correcting code as a building block.
Definition 23. Let ECC be a linear erasure correcting code with an encoder ECCenc : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}N and a decoding algorithm ECCdec. Let σ be an F-tampering strategy associate with
Aβ,affine. Let R ⊂ P be of size |R| = r and ΠR denotes the block-wise projection function on the
block index set R. The induced tampering gvσ,R : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n at a particular view value v for
given ECC, σ and R is defined as follows.
gvσ,R : = ECCdecR ◦ ΠR ◦ f
v ◦ ECCenc, (8)
where σ(v) = f v ∈ F .
4.1 Non-Malleable with respect to Affine Tampering
We are now in a good position to show a reduction from affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret
sharing with respect to Faffine to affine non-malleable extractors.
Theorem 24. Let anmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ be a µ-invertible affine non-malleable (n − tN/P −
β, εA)-extractor and anmExt
−1 : {0, 1}ℓ × R → {0, 1}n be its inverter that maps an s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to
one of its pre-images chosen uniformly at random. Let ECCenc : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}N be the encoder
of a linear erasure correcting code ECC that tolerates N − rN/P erasures with decoding error δ.
Let {
Share(s) = ECCenc(anmExt−1(s))
RecstR(cR) = anmExt(ECCdecR(cR)),
where R ⊂ P with |R| = r. Then the coding scheme (Share,Recst) is an adaptive affine leakage-
resilient non-malleable secret sharing with respect to Faffine with security parameters ε = (2
ℓ+1εA+
µ, δ, leakage bound β and ramp parameters (t, r, P ).
Proof. Reconstruction from any r shares follows trivially from the functionality of ECC. We next
show privacy and leakage-resiliency. Our analysis starts with sharing a uniform secret. According
to the definition of a µ-invertible extractor, we have
Un
µ
∼ anmExt−1(Uℓ). (9)
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Without loss of generality, we will assume the message of the erasure correcting code ECC is Un at
the cost of an increase of µ in the final error parameter. For any adaptive β-bounded affine leakage
adversary Aβ,affine, let V : = View
O(ECCenc(Un))
Aβ,affine
be the view of the adversary on the encoding of a
uniform source. Since ECCenc is a linear function, V is the image of an affine function. This shows
that (Un|V = v) is an affine source with at least n − tN/P − β entropy. The affine non-malleable
(n− tN/P − β, εA)-extractor amnExt is in particular an affine (n− tN/P − β, εA)-extractor, which
yields
((V, anmExt(Un))|V = v)
εA∼ ((V,Uℓ)|V = v) or simply (V, anmExt(Un))
εA∼ (V,Uℓ).
This together with Lemma 13 with respect to the event anmExt(Un) = s for any secret s gives a
privacy and leakage-resiliency error of 2ℓ+1εA.
We finally show non-malleability. For any affine tampering strategy σ and R ⊂ P with |R| = r,
let W : = gVσ,R(Un) denote the tampered source of anmExt. According to Definition 23, the induced
tampering gvσ,R is an affine function for any V = v. The functionality of the affine non-malleable
(n− tN/P − β, εA)-extractor asserts that there is a distribution Dgv
σ,R
such that
((anmExt(W), anmExt(Un))|V = v)
εA∼ (Copy(Dgv
σ,R
,Uℓ),Uℓ),
where the two copies of Uℓ are the same random variable and are independent of Dgvσ,R.
Let DAβ,affine,σ,R be the convex combination of {Dgvσ,R |v ∈ V} with coefficients {Pr[V = v]|v ∈ V},
where V is the range of the affine leakage function. We then have
(anmExt(W), anmExt(Un))
εA∼ (Copy(DAβ,affine,σ,R,Uℓ),Uℓ), (10)
where the two copies of Uℓ are the same random variable and are independent of DAβ,affine,σ,R.
Applying Lemma 13 to (10) with respect to the event anmExt(Un) = s for any secret s yields
(anmExt(W)|anmExt(Un) = s)
2ℓ·εA∼ Copy(DAβ,affine,σ,R, s),
where DAβ,affine,σ,R is independent of s.
Since the tampering experiment with respect to the tuple Aβ,affine, σ,R and s is µ-close to
(anmExt(W)|anmExt(Un) = s) according to (9), we have
Tamper
Aβ,affine,σ,R
s
µ+2ℓ·εA∼ Copy(DAβ,affine,σ,R, s).
Theorem 24 gives a clean reduction from an affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing
to an invertible affine non-malleable extractor and a linear code that correct erasures. Note that
we can use any explicit constructions of invertible affine non-malleable extractors and erasure
correcting codes. Any improvement in the constructions of the building blocks will lead to affine
leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing with better parameters.
Remark 25. The constructions of affine non-malleable extractors (Lemma 10 and Lemma 11)
require source entropy n − nξ/2 and have output length ℓ = nΩ(1) with extractor error εA =
2−n
Ω(1)
+ n2−n
ξ/2, for some 0 < ξ < 1. According to [CL17], they can be made invertible with
µ = εA. This means that the privacy threshold t must satisfy
n− tN/P ≥ n− nξ/2
τ=t/P
−→
τN
n
≤
nξ/2
n
n
N
≤1
−→ τ ≤
nξ
2n
,
21
and the non-malleability error is (2ℓ + 1) · εA. The construction in [CL17] crucially relies on high
entropy of the source (entropy n − nξ/2). This means that the affine non-malleable extractors in
[CL17] requires the τ = t/P to be small, hence a large P for given t. On the other hand, by replacing
the linear erasure correcting code ECC with a stochastic affine code, we can reconstruct the secret
with any ρ fraction of share vector with negligible error probability at rate RECC =
n
N ≈
r
P . And
this replacement does not affect the analysis of non-malleability in Theorem 24. In particular, the
induced tampering gvσ,R in (8) becomes
gvσ,R : = ECCdec
r˜
R ◦ ΠR ◦ f
v ◦ ECCencr, (8’)
where r and r˜ denote the randomness of the stochastic code and its tampered version, respectively.
But since the stochastic code is affine, which means for any fixing of its randomness r both ECCencr
and ECCdecr˜R are affine functions, the induced tampering g
v
σ,R is still an affine function. This means
that we can obtain a scheme with arbitrary relative reconstruction threshold ρ > τ . Finally, the
output length of the affine non-malleable extractor is ℓ = nΩ(1) and the non-malleability error
bound from Theorem 24 is (2ℓ+1) · εA. In this case, we can not use all ℓ bits for secrets. A way to
control the non-malleability error is to use ℓ− a bits for the real secret and append a random bits.
This, however, reduces the secret length.
4.2 Non-Malleable with respect to Bit-wise Independent Tampering
We consider strengthening the construction of affine leakage-resilient secret sharing in Theorem 20
to obtain affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing. Intuitively, we want to replace the
linear seeded extractor Ext in Theorem 20 with a linear seeded non-malleable extractor nmExt. Us-
ing a seeded non-malleable extractor in the construction of non-malleable codes has many challenges
(as far as we known this has not been considered in the literature). First of all, the tampered source
and the original source are not the same. We should first reduce the different sources situation to
a same source situation in order to be able to use the functionality of nmExt. Secondly, seeded
non-malleable extractors allow the seed to be arbitrarily tampered, but impose a condition that the
tampered seed should never be the same as the original seed (the seed tampering function has no
fixed point). Lemma 19 only shows that the original seed and the tampered seed are both uniform
and independent of the original source and tampered source, respectively. But the two seeds could
be related in an arbitrary way, for example, collide with any probability. When the tampered seed
coincides the original seed, we don’t have independence guarantee for the two copies of outputs. In
fact, they are related. We then exploit this relation and use an AMD pre-coding of the secret to
detect the tampering. Besides the challenges coming from using a seeded non-malleable extractor,
to be able to invoke Lemma 19, the tampered source should have enough entropy. But we know
the adversary of non-malleable secret sharing can overwrite almost the full share vector and leave
a small amount of entropy in the tampered source. Luckily, in this case, we can simply consider
the tampered source as a leakage and make the source itself independent of the secret. To address
these challenges in a systematic fashion, we define the entropy of an affine function with respect to
an affine source and use it to separate our discussion into two cases.
The entropy of a function is the entropy of its output when the input is uniform. Recall that
our analysis is focused on induced tampering (see Definition 23) that is applied to the source of the
invertible affine extractor. Since the induced tampering gvσ,R is applied only under the condition
that the view value is v, we then have to consider the entropy of a function when its input is not
uniform. We consider an extension of the notion and define the entropy of a function g with respect
to a source X.
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Definition 26. The entropy of a function g with respect to a source X is the quantity H∞(g(X)).
From now on, we consider a linear erasure correcting code ECC with encoder ECCenc : {0, 1}d+n →
{0, 1}N . Let the input to aExt′′ be (Sd||Un). We refer to the first d bits as the seed indica-
tor and only consider Un as the source of aExt
′′. In fact, in the security analysis, we always
consider a fixed Sd = sd. For any adaptive β-bounded affine leakage adversary Aβ,affine, let
V : = View
O(ECCenc(sd||Un))
Aβ,affine
denote the view of the adversary on the encoding of a uniform source.
We have that (Un|V = v) is an affine source with at least n− tN/P −β entropy. For any tampering
strategy f and reconstruction set R ⊂ [N ] with |R| = r, let
(s˜d||W) : = gVσ,R(sd||Un)
denote the tampered source of aExt′′. According to Definition 23, the induced tampering gvσ,R is an
affine function for any V = v. We call the entropy of gvσ,R with respect to the source (Un|V = v)
the entropy of gvσ,R for short. The entropy of an affine function g with respect to an affine source
X is equal to the dimension of the support of the affine source g(X). The entropy of gvσ,R is then an
integer. It is easier to consider gvσ,R as a function defined over the support of the distribution Un|V =
v (instead of {0, 1}n). Then we have that the entropy of gvσ,R is H∞(W|V = v) = dim(Im(g
v
σ,R)).
Now the fundamental theorem of linear algebra yields
n− H∞(V) = dim(Ker(g
v
σ,R)) + H∞(W|(V = v)). (11)
The quantity dim(Ker(gvσ,R)) characterizes the remaining entropy of (Un|V = v) after revealing
W = w for some particular w.
We are now ready to strengthen the linear seeded extractor Ext in Theorem 20 to a linear
non-malleable extractor nmExt and show that this together with an AMD pre-coding of the secret
provides non-malleability.
Theorem 27. Let aExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}d be a (n−tN/P−β2 −ℓ, εA)-affine extractor. Let nmExt : {0, 1}
d×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ be a linear (n−tN/P−β2 − d, εE)-strong extractor with error εE < 2
−(d+3). Let
ECCenc : {0, 1}d+n → {0, 1}N be the encoder of a linear erasure correcting code ECC that corrects
N − rN/P erasures with probability δ. Let (AMDenc,AMDdec) be an AMD code with detection
error εAMD. Let

Share(s) = ECCenc(Sd||X), where X
$
← nmExt−1(Z,AMDenc(s)) and
Sd = Z+ aExt(X) with Z
$
← {0, 1}d
RecstR(cR) = AMDdec(nmExt(aExt(x˜) + s˜d, x˜)), where (s˜d||x˜) = ECCdecR(cR),
where R ⊂ P with |R| = r. Let ε = 2ℓ+d+7εA+4εE+εAMD. Then the coding scheme (Share,Recst)
is an adaptive affine leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing with respect to FBIT with security
parameters ε, δ, leakage bound β and ramp parameters (t, r, P ).
The proof of Theorem 27 is rather involved and is given in Appendix C. We provide outline
of the proof here. Recall that our goal is to replace the anmExt in (10) with an invertible affine
extractor aExt′′(sd||·) : = nmExt(aExt(·) + sd, ·) constructed from suitable affine extractor aExt and
seeded non-malleable extractor nmExt such that there is a distribution DAβ,affine,σ,R satisfying
(aExt′′(s˜d||W), aExt′′(sd||Un)) ∼ (Copy(DAβ,affine,σ,R,Uℓ),Uℓ), (10’)
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where (s˜d||W) : = gVσ,R(sd||Un) denote the tampered source of the affine extractor with V : =
View
O(ECCenc(sd||Un))
Aβ,affine
denoting the view of the adversary Aβ,affine on the encoding of a uniform
source. In other words, we want the secret S : = aExt′′(sd||Un) to be independent of the tampered
outcome aExt′′(s˜d||W). Similar to the proof of Theorem 24, we proceed by first conditioned on a
particular view V = v. A slight difference is we now need to discuss two cases according to the
entropy H∞(W|V = v).
1. If the entropy H∞(W|V = v) is less than
n−tN/P−β
2 , we can prove (12). Intuitively, if the
induced affine tampering function gvσ,R(·) overwrites many bits and the information contained
inW is small enough that we can considerW as a virtual leakage (together with the real leakage
V) and directly argue independence. More concretely, the affine source Un|(V = v,W = w)
has entropy n−H∞(V)−H∞(W|V = v), which is at least n− tN/P −
n−tN/P−β
2 , big enough
for the affine extractor aExt′′(·). We then have (aExt′′(sd||Un))|(V = v,W = w)) ∼ Uℓ and
hence
((W, aExt′′(sd||Un)))|V = v) ∼ ((W,Uℓ)|V = v). (12)
2. If the entropy H∞(W|V = v) is at least
n−tN/P−β
2 , our target is (10’) and we have enough
entropy for generating an independent uniform seed for nmExt in the term aExt′′(s˜d||W).
But two differences between seedless and seeded non-malleable extractors prevent us from
obtaining (10’), and have to settle for (13). Roughly speaking, we allow the tampered outcome
to be related to the original secret S : = aExt′′(sd||Un) in a simple way (thanks to restriction
to bit-wise tampering) in the event E¯gv
σ,R
, when the tampered seed is the same as the original
seed and the security of a seeded non-malleable extractor is not available. More concretely,{
((aExt′′(s˜d||W),S)|(V = v, Egv
σ,R
)) ∼ ((aExt′′(s˜d||W),Uℓ)|(V = v, Egvσ,R))
((aExt′′(s˜d||W),S)|(V = v, E¯gv
σ,R
)) ∼ ((S+∆gv
σ,R
,S)|(V = v, E¯gv
σ,R
)),
(13)
where Egvσ,R denotes the event that the tampered seed is different from the original seed,
which is solely determined by gvσ,R, and ∆gvσ,R is a distribution determined by g
v
σ,R (hence
independent of S). In the event Egvσ,R, the reconstructed secret is independent of the original
secret. In the event E¯gv
σ,R
, the AMD decoder outputs ⊥, by definition.
Remark 28 (On Explicit Constructions of Linear Non-malleable Extractors). The only linear non-
malleable extractors we found in the literature is an inner product based construction IP(X, enc(Z)),
where IP(·, ·) denotes the inner product of vectors over finite field Fq and enc(Z) is a specific encoding
of the seed Z [Li12]. Let q = 2ℓ. We can have a non-malleable extractor that outputs ℓ bits with
exponentially small error, if the source X ← F
n
ℓ
q has more than half entropy rate. This extractor
is F2-linear because for any seed Z = z, we have IP(X+ X
′, enc(z)) = IP(X, enc(z)) + IP(X′, enc(z)).
This linear non-malleable extractor’s output is a constant fraction of n and error is exponentially
small in n. This extractor requires a source entropy rate bigger than half, which makes it not
applicable in our construction since the entropy requirement of nmExt is n−tN/P−β2 − d <
n
2 .
This entropy rate around half barrier existed in the literature of (non-linear) non-malleable
extractor constructions [DLWZ14], but was quickly overcome [CGL16b], being only a technical
barrier (not inherent). We next show that to output a Ω(log n) number of uniform bits with
negligible error, at most φn bits of entropy suffices, for any constant φ > 0. This is shown using a
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probabilistic argument (see Appendix D for its proof) and we leave the explicit construction as an
interesting open problem.
We conclude this section by stating an existence result for the linear seeded non-malleable
extractors with our required parameters.
Theorem 29. For all integers n, d,m and positive parameters k, ε, there is a linear seeded non-
malleable (k, ε)-extractor E : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m provided that{
d ≥ log(n/ε2) +O(1),
2m ≤ log(k + log ε)− log(1/ε2)− log d−O(1).
(14)
5 Conclusion
We studied leakage-resilient secret sharing in the non-compartmentalized models and explicitly
constructed them for the class of affine leakage functions. The adversary can apply affine leakage
functions to the full share vector to obtain the outputs (subject to only a total length bound)
as well as outputting any unauthorized set of shares. We gave constructions for non-adaptive
adversary and adaptive adversary, respectively. The construction for non-adaptive adversary is
near optimal in the sense that the secret length is almost equal to the share length minus the
number of leaked bits. We extended our study to make these affine leakage-resilient secret sharing
also non-malleable with respect to a family F of tampering functions. We gave a construction
for the family Faffine of affine tampering functions for secret sharing with low threshold. For the
family FBIT of Bit-wise Independent Tampering functions, we gave a construction with all choice of
threshold. One interesting open question is whether affine leakage and tampering can be studied for
secret sharing with arbitrary monotone access structure. Or on the other hand, whether other non-
compartmentalized models can be studied for secret sharing, even the threshold secret sharing. Our
results about leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing also motivate open questions concerning
explicit constructions of randomness extractors, in particular, affine non-malleable extractors and
linear seeded non-malleable extractors.
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Appendices
A Proof for Lemma 13
Proof. Assume by contradiction that SD(V|W ∈ E ;V′|W′ ∈ E) > 2ε
Pr[W∈E] = ε0. W.l.o.g. there is an
event Ω ⊂ V (complementing Ω if necessary) , such that
Pr[V ∈ Ω|W ∈ E ]− Pr[V′ ∈ Ω|W′ ∈ E ] > ε0.
Now consider the event Ω× E ⊂ V ×W. We have{
Pr[(V,W) ∈ Ω× E ] = Pr[V ∈ Ω|W ∈ E ] · Pr[W ∈ E ];
Pr[(V′,W′) ∈ Ω× E ] = Pr[V′ ∈ Ω|W′ ∈ E ] · Pr[W′ ∈ E ].
On the other hand, we have SD(W;W′) ≤ SD(V,W;V′,W′) ≤ ε and hence
Pr[W ∈ E ] ≥ Pr[W′ ∈ E ]− ε.
We then can derive the following contradiction.
Pr[(V,W) ∈ Ω× E ]− Pr[(V′,W′) ∈ Ω× E ]
≥ Pr[W′ ∈ E ] · (Pr[V ∈ Ω|W ∈ E ]− Pr[V′ ∈ Ω|W′ ∈ E ])− ε
> Pr[W′ ∈ E ] · ε0 − ε
= ε.
This concludes the proof.
B Proof for Theorem 17
The proof of Theorem 17 will follow naturally from Lemma 30. We first recall this general property
of a linear strong extractor, which is proved in [LCG+19].
Lemma 30 ([LCG+19]). Let Ext : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a linear strong (k, ε)-extractor.
Let fA : {0, 1}
d+n → {0, 1}a be any affine function with output length a ≤ n− k. For any m,m′ ∈
{0, 1}m, let (Z,X) = (Ud,Un)| (Ext(Ud,Un) = m) and (Z
′,X′) = (Ud,Un)| (Ext(Ud,Un) = m
′). We
have
SD(fA(Z,X); fA(Z
′,X′)) ≤ 8ε. (15)
With Lemma 30 at hand, we are now in a good position to prove Theorem 17.
Proof of Theorem 17. The reconstruction from r shares follows trivially from the definition of
stochastic erasure correcting code. We now prove the privacy and leakage resiliency.
The sharing algorithm of the scheme (before applying the stochastic affine code) takes a secret,
which is a particular extractor output s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and uniformly samples a seed z ∈ {0, 1}d of Ext
before uniformly finds an x ∈ {0, 1}n such that Ext(z, x) = s. This process of obtaining (z, x) is
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the same as sampling uniformly and independently (Ud,Un)
$
← {0, 1}d+n and then restricting to
Ext(Ud,Un) = s. We define the random variable pair
(Z,X) := (Ud,Un)| (Ext(Ud,Un) = s) (16)
and refer to it as the pre-image of s.
Let ΠA :
(
{0, 1}N/P
)P
→
(
{0, 1}N/P
)t
be the projection function that maps a share vector
to the t shares with index set A ⊆ P chosen by the non-adaptive adversary. Observe that the
combination (ΠA ◦ SA-ECCenc) : {0, 1}
d+n → {0, 1}t (for any fixed randomness r of SA-ECCenc) is
an affine function. Moreover, for any affine leakage function l : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}β , the composition
(l ◦ SA-ECCenc) : {0, 1}d+n → {0, 1}β is also an affine function. So the view of the adversary is
simply the output of the affine function fA = (ΠA ◦ SA-ECCenc||l ◦ SA-ECCenc), where “||” denotes
concatenation, applied to the random variable tuple (Z,X) defined in (16).
We can now formulate the privacy of the scheme in this context. We want to prove that the
statistical distance of the views of the adversary for a pair of secrets s and s′ can be made arbitrarily
small. The views of the adversary are the outputs of the affine function fA with inputs (Z,X) and
(Z′,X′) for the secret s and s′, respectively. According to Lemma 30, we then have that the privacy
and leakage-resiliency error is 8× ε8 = ε.
C Proof for Theorem 27
Proof. Reconstruction from any r shares follows from the functionality of ECC and the invertibil-
ity guarantee of the invertible extractor, which insures that any correctly recovered pre-image is
mapped back to the original secret.
We next prove non-malleability. Consider a uniform secret Uℓ. By the uniformity guarantee
of the inverter, we have Share(Uℓ) = ECCenc(Sd||Un). Our analysis is done for any fixed Sd = sd.
This captures a stronger adversary who on top of adaptively reading t shares, also has access to
Sd through an oracle. It is easy to see that the fixing of Sd = sd does not alter the distribution of
the source Un, which remains uniform over {0, 1}
n. Let V : = View
O(ECCenc(sd||Un))
Aβ,affine
denote the view
of the adversary A on the encoding of a uniform source. Let (s˜d||W) : = gVσ,R(sd||Un) denote the
tampered source of the affine extractor aExt′′(sd||·) : = Ext(aExt(·)+ sd, ·). Let Z : = aExt(Un)+ sd
denote the original seed of nmExt, which is in particular a strong linear extractor. Let S : =
nmExt(Z,Un). We study the random variable tuple (V,W,Z,S) to complete the proof.
1. Handling the low entropy case. We assume the induced tampering gvσ,R has entropy at most
n−tN/P−β
2 . This means that (Un|(V = v,W = w)) has entropy at least
n−tN/P−β
2 , according
to (11).
The tuple (Z,S)|(V = v,W = w) for any fixed V = v and W = w is by definition (aExt(Un) +
sd,Ext(aExt(Un) + sd,Un))|(V = v,W = w). Since (Un|(V = v,W = w)) is an affine source
with at least n−tN/P−β2 entropy, according to Lemma 19, we have
(Z,S)|(V = v,W = w)
2d+3εA∼ (Ud,Ext(Ud,Un))|(V = v,W = w).
Our concern is the relation between S and W, and therefore would like to further condition
on values of Z. In this step, we crucially use the linearity of nmExt and the underlying
linear space structure of the affine source (Un|(V = v,W = w)) to claim that there is a
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subset G ⊂ {0, 1}d of good seeds such that Pr[Ud ∈ G] ≥ 1 − 4εE and for any z ∈ G,
the distribution of nmExt(z,Un)|(V = v,W = w) is exactly uniform. This is true because
nmExt(z,Un)|(V = v,W = w) is an affine source. If its entropy is ℓ, then it is exactly uniform.
If its entropy is less than ℓ, its statistical distance εzE from uniform is at least
1
2 . Using an
averaging argument we have that at least 1− 4εE fraction of the seeds should satisfy ε
z
E <
1
4 ,
and hence εzE = 0. We then use Lemma 13 with respect to the event Z ∈ G to claim that
S|(V = v,W = w,Z ∈ G)
2d+4εA
1−4εE∼ nmExt(Ud,X)|(V = v,W = w,Ud ∈ G),
where the right hand side is exactly Uℓ. Note that the subset G is determined by the indices
of the t shares chosen by the leakage adversary Aβ,affine and the induced tampering function
gvσ,R, hence remains the same for any value of W = w. We then have
((W,S)|(V = v,Z ∈ G))
2d+4εA
1−4εE∼ ((W,Uℓ)|V = v).
Another application of Lemma 13 with respect to the event S = s gives
(W|(V = v,Z ∈ G,S = s))
2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1−4εE∼ (W|V = v).
We finally bound the non-malleability error as follows.
SD(W|(V = v,S = s); (W|V = v))
= Pr[Z ∈ G] · SD((W|(V = v,S = s,Z ∈ G)); (W|V = v))
+Pr[Z /∈ G] · SD((W|(V = v,S = s,Z /∈ G)); (W|V = v))
≤ 1 · 2
(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1−4εE
+ (4εE + εA) · 1
< 2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)+1εA + 4εE .
2. Handling the high entropy case. We assume the induced tampering gvσ,R has entropy at least
n−tN/P−β
2 .
Note that for any bit-wise independent function f v, we can define a difference function ∆f v
such that for any c ∈ {0, 1}N ,
f v(c) = c+∆f v(c).
The difference function ∆f v also induces a source tampering ∆gvσ,R. Now since the erasure
correcting code ECC is linear, we must have for any m ∈ {0, 1}d+n,
gvσ,R(m) = m+∆g
v
σ,R(m).
Let ∆W : = ∆gVσ,R(sd||Un) be the tapered source induced by the difference function ∆f
v. We
immediately have
W = Un +∆W. (17)
Moreover, since the overwrite bit functions of f v become non-overwrite bit functions of ∆f v,
we then have
H∞(∆W|V = v) = n− H∞(V)− H∞(W|V = v).
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This means that the dimension of the kernel space of ∆f v restricted to the support of (Un|V =
v) satisfies the following.
dim(Ker(∆gvσ,R)) = n− H∞(V)− H∞(∆W|V = v) = H∞(W|V = v) ≥
n− tN/P − β
2
. (18)
The quantity dim(Ker(∆gvσ,R)) characterises the remaining entropy in Un after conditioning
on V = v and ∆W = ∆w, for any particular ∆w.
Now since by assumption H∞(W|V = v) ≥
n−tN/P−β
2 , Lemma 19 says that
((aExt(W) + s˜d, aExt′′(s˜d||W))|V = v)
2d+3εA∼ ((Z′, nmExt(Z′,W))|V = v), (19)
where Z′ is a uniform seed independent of W. We next use (17) and the linearity of nmExt to
claim that
((Z′, nmExt(Z′,W))|V = v) = ((Z′, nmExt(Z′,Un) + nmExt(Z
′,∆W))|V = v).
We next show that the additive term nmExt(Z′,∆W) can be ignored in the subsequent analysis
of comparing nmExt(Z′,W) against nmExt(Z,Un). Since the remaining entropy in Un after
conditioning on V = v and ∆W = ∆w is at least n−tN/P−β2 (see (18)), we have according to
the functionality of nmExt that
((Z, nmExt(T (Z),Un), nmExt(Z,Un))|(V = v,∆W = ∆w))
εE∼ ((Z, nmExt(T (Z),Un),Uℓ)|(V = v,∆W = ∆w)),
where T (·) is a seed tampering function without fixed point. Let Egvσ,R denote the event that
Z 6= Z′ and w.l.o.g. assume 0 < Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
]
< 1. Applying Lemma 13 with respect to the event
Egv
σ,R
yields
((Z, nmExt(Z′,Un), nmExt(Z,Un))|(V = v,∆W = ∆w, Egvσ,R))
εE
Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
]
∼ ((Z, nmExt(Z′,Un),Uℓ)|(V = v,∆W = ∆w, Egvσ,R)).
Now for any original seed z and its tampered version z′, we always have that (nmExt(z,Un)|(V =
v,∆W = ∆w, Egv
σ,R
, nmExt(z′,Un) = s˜)), for any s˜, is an affine source. Its statistical distance
to uniform is then either 0 or at least 12 . Using an averaging argument, we have for at most
4εE
Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
] fraction of such seeds, the above statistical distance exceeds 14 . Let B denote these
bad seeds. We then have
((nmExt(Z′,W), nmExt(Z,Un))|(V = v,∆W = ∆w, Egv
σ,R
,Z /∈ B))
= ((nmExt(Z′,W),Uℓ)|(V = v,∆W = ∆w, Egvσ,R ,Z /∈ B)).
Taking the error that incurs transforming from seedless extractor to seeded extractor (19)
into account, we have that when the event Egvσ,R occurs, the non-malleability error is upper
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bounded as follows.
εEgv
σ,R
≤ 1 · 2
(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1−
4εE
Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
] +

 4εE
Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
] + εA

 · 1
≤ 2
(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1−2d+2εE
+

 4εE
Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
] + εA


< 2(ℓ+2)+(d+4)εA +
4εE
Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
] ,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
]
≥ 2−d once Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
]
> 0
and the last inequality follows from the assumption that εE < 2
−(d+3).
On the other hand, if the complimentary event E¯gvσ,R occurs, then
((Z, nmExt(Z,W),S)|(V = v,∆W = ∆w))
= ((Z,S + nmExt(Z,∆w),S)|(V = v,∆W = ∆w)).
This means that the tampering results in turning S into S+ nmExt(Z,∆w), where the offset
nmExt(Z,∆w) is independent of S. In this case, let S be the AMD codeword of the real
secret with fresh independent encoding randomness. The decoder of the AMD code outputs
⊥ with εAMD. Taking the error that incurs transforming from seedless extractor to seeded
extractor (19) into account, we have that when the complimentary event E¯gv
σ,R
occurs, the
non-malleability error is upper bounded as follows.
εE¯gv
σ,R
≤ 1 ·
2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA
1− Pr
[
Egvσ,R
] + εAMD · 1.
Finally, the total non-malleability error is
ε ≤ Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
]
· εEgv
σ,R
+
(
1− Pr
[
Egv
σ,R
])
· εE¯gv
σ,R
<
(
2(ℓ+2)+(d+4)εA + 4εE
)
+
(
2(ℓ+1)+(d+4)εA + εAMD
)
< 2ℓ+d+7εA + 4εE + εAMD.
D Proof for Theorem 29
Proof. We adapt the proof of [DW09] to show the existence of non-malleable extractors that are
linear; i.e., the extractor is a linear function for every fixed seed. This will however result in much
weaker parameters than non-linear counterparts.
For a function E : {0, 1}d×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, distinguisher D : {0, 1}d×{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, seed
tampering adversary A : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d, and error parameter ε, call an input x ∈ {0, 1}n bad for
the tuple (E,A,D) if it violates the following condition for a uniform random seed S
$
← {0, 1}d:
|Pr[D(S,E(A(S), x),E(S, x)) = 1]− Pr[D(S,E(A(S), x),Um) = 1]| ≤ ε.
Let B(E,A,D, ε) denote the set of all bad inputs for (E,A,D) for the parameter ε. We have the
following.
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Lemma 31. Suppose |B(E,A,D, ε)| ≤ ε2k for all distinguishers D and adversaries A. Then E is a
non-malleable (k, 2ε)-extractor.
Proof. Consider any source X of min-entropy at least k, any distinguisher D and adversary A.
Then,
Pr[X ∈ B(E,A,D, ε)] ≤ |B(E,A,D, ε)|2−k ≤ ε.
Let ∆: = |Pr[D(S,E(A(S),X),E(S,X)) = 1]− Pr[D(S,E(A(S),X),Um) = 1]|. We have
∆ ≤ Pr[X ∈ B(E,A,D, ε)] + ε ≤ 2ε,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the bad inputs. The result follows.
Adapting the notation of [DW09], the Martingale-based argument of [DW09] proves the follow-
ing:
Lemma 32 ([DW09], Implicit in Theorem 37). Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be fixed and E : {0, 1}d×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m be any random function such that E(s, x) is uniformly random and independent for all
choices of s ∈ {0, 1}d. Then, for any distinguisher D, adversary A, and error ε > 0,
Pr[x is bad for (E,A,D)] ≤ 4 exp(−2d−4ε2),
where the probability is over the randomness of E.
We now consider a random function E : {0, 1}d × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. This time, however, the
random function is linear. That is for every seed s, we independently sample a random m × n
matrix Ms over F2 and define E(s, x) = Msx. Consider an adversary that perturbs a seed s to A(s),
and a distinguisher D.
Let X ⊂ {0, 1}n be any set of size ε2k. Then X must have a subset I(X ) ⊂ X of size at least
log |X | = k + log ε such that the elements of I(X ) are linearly independent. This means that the
random variables E(s, x) for all x ∈ I(X ) and s ∈ {0, 1}d are jointly independent. In particular, the
events “x is bad for (E,A,D)” are also jointly independent for x ∈ I(X ). Therefore, using Lemma
32,
Pr[all x ∈ X are bad for (E,A,D)] ≤ Pr[all x ∈ I(X ) are bad for (E,A,D)]
≤ 4|I(X )| exp(−2d−4ε2|I(X )|)
< exp(2|I(X )| − 2d−4ε2|I(X )|).
Now, using the above bound and the fact that |I(X )| = k + log ε, we have
Pr[|B(E,A,D, ε)| > ε2k] ≤ Pr[(∃X ) : all x ∈ X are bad for (E,A,D)]
< exp
(
(2− 2d−4ε2)|I(X )|
)
·
( 2n
|I(X )|
)
= exp
(
(2− 2d−4ε2)(k + log ε)
)
·
( 2n
k+log ε
)
,
where in the last inequality we have used a union bound over all possibilities of I(X ). Now, by
using a union bound over all choices of D and A and using Lemma 31, we conclude that
Pr[E is not a non-malleable (k, ε)-extractor]
≤ exp
(
(2− 2d−4ε2)(k + log ε)
)
· 2n(k+log ε)+2
d+2m+d2d .
The right hand side can be made less than 1, hence ensuring the existence of a linear non-malleable
(k, ε)-extractor provided that (14) holds.
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